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Background: Improving the quality of care at hospitals is a key next step in rebuilding Liberia’s health system. In
order to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of care at the secondary hospital level, the country is
developing a system to upgrade health worker skills and competencies, and shifting towards improved provider
accountability for results, including a Graduate Medical Residency Program (GMRP) and provider accountability for
improvements in quality through performance-based financing (PBF) at the hospital level.
Methods/design: This document outlines the protocol for the impact evaluation of the hospital improvement
program. The evaluation will provide an estimate of the impact of the project and investigate the mechanism for
success in a way that can provide general lessons about the quality of health care in low-income countries. The
evaluation aims 1) to provide the best possible estimate of program impact and 2) to quantitatively describe the
changes that took place within facilities as a result of the program. In particular, the impact evaluation focuses on
the changes in human resources within the hospitals. As such, we use a three-period intensive evaluation of treated
and matched comparison hospitals to see how services change in treated hospitals as well as a continuous data
collection effort to track the activities of individual health workers within treated hospitals.
Discussion: We are particularly interested in understanding how facilities met quality targets. Did they bring in
new health workers with higher qualifications? Did they improve the knowledge or competence of their existing
staff? Did they improve the availability of medicines and equipment so that the capacities of existing health
workers were improved? Did they address the motivation of health workers so that individuals with the same
competence and capacity were able to provide higher quality? And, if they did improve quality, did patients
notice?
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Health-care qualityBackground
The civil war destroyed Liberia’s health system. Much of
the physical infrastructure and equipment that were
crucial to the health sector were destroyed during the
war—many hospitals and clinics were burned to the
ground; very few county hospitals had fully functional
laboratories; most county hospitals and health centers
were without running water, electricity, or functioning
basic sanitary systems; and many health professionals,
especially physicians, left the country. The latter resulted
in a severe shortage of human resources. An already dire* Correspondence: kleonard@arec.umd.edu
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Despite impressive gains in overall health systems
management and in health services delivery since the
end of the war [1], Liberia continues to face significant
challenges in improving maternal and child health
outcomes, as well as other health-related Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) outcomes [2]. Post-conflict
conditions place Liberia at the bottom of global rankings
for maternal and child health. The maternal mortality ra-
tio remains high, but has declined from close to 1,000 per
100,000 births in 2007 to an estimated 770 per 100,000 in
2010. Gains, however, remain skewed in favor of urban
populations. For example, 63% of deliveries in urban areastral. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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similarly, 77% of urban deliveries are by a skilled service
provider compared with only 32% of rural deliveries.
While over one in ten children will die before the age of
five, infant and under-five mortality rates have almost
halved to 71 and 110 per 1,000 births, respectively, over
the last 20 years due to improved access resulting from
the Government of Liberia’s (GOL) free health-care policy
and restoration of a number of key child health services
like immunizations. Malaria, however, continues to be
a major source of morbidity and mortality; 38% of out-
patient attendance and 42% of inpatient deaths were
attributable to malaria in 2007.
Improving the quality of care at hospitals is a key next
step in rebuilding Liberia’s health system. Hospitals in
Liberia remain in generally poor physical condition; are
staffed with insufficient numbers of productive, respon-
sive, and qualified staff in key areas of competence [3];
have long waiting times; and lack equipment and drugs
[4]. As a consequence, hospitals in general provide low
quality of care. This is reflected in high levels of post-
surgery complications and infection rates, low-quality
data on clinical outcomes, very limited maternal and
child death audits, and no systematic use of clinical
guidelines and protocols. Poor quality is a particularly
critical concern at the severely resource-constrained
hospital level in Liberia because it can obviate the im-
plied benefits of good access and effective treatment,
frustrate the positive achievements at the primary health-
care system by not being able to respond to referral
patients with complications, and lead to sub-optimal and
wasteful use of resources [5].
In order to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and
quality of care at the secondary hospital level, the country
is developing a system to upgrade health worker skills and
competencies and shifting towards improved provider ac-
countability for results. The Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare (MoHSW) is tasked to develop a Graduate
Medical Residency Program (GMRP) to facilitate in-
country specialization of core MDG-related hospital-level
competencies. Residents will be selected from the existing
pool of medical school graduates based on standardized
criteria. This process requires both a critical stream of
specialist faculty to support the program, as well as the
upgrading of teaching facilities. In addition to the develop-
ment of an MDG-related GMRP, the GOL is also moving
towards provider accountability for improvements in
quality through performance-based financing (PBF) at
the hospital level. The shift towards PBF is influenced
by experiences in a number of high-, middle-, and low-
income countries that performance-based approaches,
in which providers receive incentives based on perform-
ance, can improve provider accountability for improved
quality of health services.The project development objective
The project development objective of the Liberia Health
Systems Strengthening Project (HSSP) is to “improve the
quality of maternal health, child health, and infectious
disease services in selected secondary-level health facil-
ities”. The project aims to strengthen the institutional
capacity needed to improve maternal health, child health,
and infectious disease-related health outcomes at target
facilities through an innovative approach involving
systematic and coordinated improvements to the qual-
ity of services delivered at target facilities (through
performance-based incentives) and an expansion of
health worker skills (through the provision of specialized
training and decentralization of specialist availability).
Specifically, the project will (a) focus on improving the
quality of care standards (in both diagnosis and treat-
ment) for services with proven effectiveness; (b) in-
crease the availability of qualified graduate physicians
(pediatricians, obstetricians, general surgeons, and in-
ternal medicine specialists, with cross-cutting focus on
anesthesiology); (c) enhance the clinical capabilities
and competencies of mid-level cadres—nurses, midwives,
and physician assistants—in emergency obstetrics, sur-
gery, pediatrics, and internal medicine; and (d) improve
provider-accountability mechanisms related to both the
achievement of results and health worker performance at
selected facilities. These improvements should provide a
thrust towards improved outcomes.
The HSSP is focused on improving the quality of care
in a number of services, outlined in Table 1. Note that
the program only incentivizes quantities for a few num-
bers of services because, as hospitals, the goal is not to
attract patients away from more appropriate locations
but to provide the best care for those patients who need
hospital care. However, although the PBF aspect of the
program focuses on these services, the levers of the
HSSP will affect a much broader array of services. In
particular, the program increases the skills of health
workers through training, improves the equipment and
infrastructure levels of the hospitals directly as well as
through increased availability of funds through PBF,
and increases the motivation of health workers directly
through the possibility of bonuses in PBF as well as im-
proved management and information. These changes
could lead to improvements in the quality of services
and, in addition, to increases in utilization of key
services.
Theory of change
Figure 1 diagrammatically demonstrates the theory of
change linking changes in skills, equipment, and motiv-
ation brought about by the levers of the HSSP and
utilization. The skills and experience of health workers
determine their competence; competence can be increased
Table 1 Services addressed by PBF
PBF services Definition
Quality of complicated and assisted pregnancy and delivery
(including C-section)
Any labor that is made more difficult or complex by a deviation from the
normal procedure. Complicated delivery is defined as assisted vaginal
deliveries (vacuum extraction or forceps), C-section, episiotomy, and
other procedures.
Quantity of normal deliveries for at-risk referrals High-risk pregnant women referred by health center to the hospital but
delivered normally. A high-risk pregnancy is defined as evidence of edema,
malpresentation, increased BP, multi-parity, etc.
Quantity of counter referral letters returned to health centers Hospital returns counter referral letters with feedback on the referred patient
to the referring health center. The counter referral letter is completed in
triplicate, with one also given to the patient and one retained by the hospital.
Quantity of newborns referred for emergency neonatal care
treatment
Newborns referred for emergency neonatal care due to perinatal
complications, low birth weight, congenital malformation, asphyxia, etc.
Quantity of referred under-fives with fever Infants and under-fives with fever who were referred to the hospital for
management of malaria and pneumonia.
Quality of minor surgical intervention Any surgical procedure that does not involve anesthesia or respiratory
assistance.
Quality of major surgery (excluding CS, including major trauma) Any surgery in which the patient must be put under general spinal/anesthesia and
given respiratory assistance. Major surgery in the case of this package of services is
defined as any of the following: herniorrhaphy, appendectomy, myomectomy,
splenectomy, salpingectomy, hysterectomy, thyroidectomy, and mastectomy.
Quantity of patients transported by ambulance Patients transferred from a lower-level facility (health center or health clinic) to
the hospital for emergency treatment.
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health workers, combined with their competence deter-
mines their capacity; capacity can be improved by changes
in competence or by structural and supply improvements
to the facility. Finally, health worker effort, combined with
capacity, determines the performance of health workers.Figure 1 Theoretical framework: theory of change.Effort is driven by motivation and can be improved
through better management, increased information,
and/or improved incentives. Performance improves meas-
urable outcomes directly and indirectly through increased
utilization of health care services from patients who are
more likely to trust the services provided.
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The HSSP will take place in five previously selected hos-
pitals. Given the small number of hospitals in Liberia, it
was determined at early stages that a full randomized
controlled trial was not feasible. Thus, for the evaluation
at the hospital level, the impact evaluation takes the
project as a given, without control over the selection of
treated or control hospitals and the timing or structure
of any interventions. Five control facilities have been
chosen to match the treated hospitals. The original cri-
teria were that hospitals be drawn from urban and rural
areas, from different regions of Liberia and from public
and private services. Thus, each control facility is matched
to the paired treatment facility on these characteristics.
Facilities were not selected on the basis of initial quality
levels or capacity to absorb the program.
These restrictions on the number of hospitals suggest
a simple before and after matched pair comparison using
measurable outcomes directly and indirectly tied to the
project. However, with only five units in treatment and
control groups, this strategy has very limited power to
detect statistically significant improvements in outcomes.
Although we will report these outcomes, the evaluation
strategy focuses, instead, on the theory of change within
treated facilities and a series of augmented PBF interven-
tions at the health worker level within treated facilities.
The external validity of the program as a whole is limited
because the design is specific to Liberia, but the lessons
about how things change within hospitals should have
more generalizable findings.
The evaluation ((574034–2) Health Systems Strength-
ening Project (Liberia) Evaluation) was reviewed by the
Institutional Review Board of the University of Maryland,
College Park, and was approved on 5/16/2014. We will
seek the consent of the management team at control hos-
pitals while treatment facilities are required to participate
in the evaluation as part of the project. All health workers
in either kind of facility have the right to refuse to be
observed, interviewed or evaluated and will sign forms if
they choose to consent. All patients and caregivers can
refuse to be observed or interviewed and the evaluation
team must obtain oral consent from all patients or
caregivers before collecting data on the services provided.
No information that could be used to identify patients will
be collected.
Evaluating the theory of change within HSSP facilities
In order to understand better how PBF (as defined by
the HSSP) is functioning within hospitals, we will
collect the data on competence, capacity, and per-
formance. Since these three measures are necessarily
linked (performance is a function of capacity and
capacity is a function of performance), we will focus
on the differences between these three measures orthe “three gaps” for health workers in treated and
control facilities.
The three-gap framework
The three-gap framework focuses on four levels of care: 1)
the competence to perform, 2) the capacity to perform, 3)
actual performance, and 4) the target levels of perform-
ance. The three gaps defined by these four levels are the
know gap, the know-can gap, and the can-do gap. Figure 2
is a graphical demonstration of the three-gap framework.
Performance originates with knowledge, education, and
skills as measured by competence (C), shown on the
vertical axis extending below the origin: increases in
competence are shown by points closer to the bottom of
the figure (further from the origin). Capacity (K) comes
from competence taking into account the infrastructure,
equipment, and medicines necessary to appropriately
use training, education, and skills, shown on the horizon-
tal axis to the right of the origin. Finally, performance
comes from taking capacity and combining it with effort:
health workers must choose to use their knowledge and
equipment in order to perform, shown on the vertical axis
above the origin.
An important feature of this model is the fact that per-
formance is limited by capacity and capacity is limited
by competence: a health worker cannot do better than
what he or she knows how to do, for example. This is
shown in the graph by what we call the capacity and
performance barriers. In the translation from compe-
tence to capacity and again from capacity to perform-
ance, we take into account the capacity barrier and
performance barrier, shown as 45° lines from the origin
in the lower right and upper right quadrants. These bar-
riers reflect the fact that better equipment cannot produce
capacity beyond the level of competence and greater effort
cannot produce performance beyond the level of capacity.
In other words, competence limits capacity and capacity
limits performance.
Target competence is the level required to perform
according to the target level of performance, marked in
Figure 2 as CT. In the ideal world, any health worker
with target competence would also have target capacity
KT: if health workers had all the equipment and medi-
cines to work according to their training, capacity and
competence would be the same. In addition, this cap-
acity (KT) would ideally translate directly into targeted
performance, PT.
The idea of the three-gap framework is that, in the real
world, not all health workers have target competence,
competence does not always translate into capacity, and
capacity does not always translate into performance. In
addition to this ideal triplet (CT, KT, PT), Figure 2 shows
an example of another possible triplet (C, K, P). Compe-
tence (C) is lower than targeted performance and because
(KT, CT)
(KT, CT)
Figure 2 The three-gap framework.
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lar health worker has capacity (K) which is lower than his
competence. This is shown by the pair (K, C) in the lower
right quadrant and the fact that (K, C) is to the left of the
capacity barrier. Furthermore, because effort is not ideal,
the health worker does not fully transform capacity into
performance (P), as shown by the pair (K, P) in the upper
right quadrant. Thus, performance is significantly below
target performance. Importantly, we can divide the short
fall into three gaps:
1) the know gap (shown as G1), which is the difference
between targeted performance and the competence
to perform,
2) the know-do gap (shown as G2), which is the difference
between competence and capacity and
3) the can-do gap (shown as G3), which is the difference
between capacity and performance.
We also examine a slightly simplified two-gap frame-
work. It is possible to reduce the three gaps down to
two gaps and this is also shown in Figure 2. By using the
lower left quadrant as a “reflector”, we can measure
competence on the horizontal axis going to the left from
the axis. The competence performance pair is shown in
the upper right quadrant as (C, P). In such a case, we
can measure the “know-do” gap which is also the sum of
the know-can and can-do gaps.
Note that these gaps are important for policy reasons.
A large know gap suggests deficiencies in training; a
large know-do gap suggests deficiencies in infrastructure,
equipment, or medicines; and a large can-do gap suggests
deficiencies in motivation. However, the size of the gapsby themselves is not enough to understand the potential
gains from changes in policy. In order to do this, we need
to understand the relationship between competence, cap-
acity, and performance.
Focusing only on the know-do gap, we can look at
some examples from available evidence and the import-
ant policy implications of this evidence. Figure 3 pre-
sents data on a sample of clinicians from urban and
rural Tanzania whose competence and performance
were measured. This graph is the mirror image of the
upper left quadrant in Figure 2. Note that four health
workers have performance above their competence,
which is not supposed to happen—real-world data are
always somewhat messy. In addition, a significant number
of clinicians are grouped near the performance barrier, as
should be expected. However, most clinicians are well
below the performance barrier.
Performance in this setting is low: clinicians only do
about 35% of what they are supposed to do for their
patients. One apparent reason for this low perform-
ance is that competence or knowledge is low: clinicians
only know about 50% of what they are supposed to
know. So, it seems that competence needs to be im-
proved. However, the data reveal a more complex rela-
tionship between competence and performance. The
dashed line on the graph shows the relationship be-
tween competence and performance over the whole
sample. For the clinician with average competence,
increasing competence by 20 percentage points (from
50% to 70%) increases performance by only three per-
centage points (from 33% to 36%), a very small gain.
On the other hand, any policy that takes competence
as a given and closes the gap between competence and
Figure 3 Empirical evidence of the know-do gap. Sources: [6,7]. The data show the measured competence and performance of a sample of
clinicians. If clinicians followed their training, every data point would be near the 45° line, where competence is equal to performance. The
dashed line shows the estimated relationship for the whole sample.
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ment of up to 17 percentage points.
Thus, for the average clinician in this sample, improv-
ing competence does not improve performance altering
the way we understand potential policies. Findings like
these have led to a shift from a focus on competence to
a focus on the know-do gap (see for example, [6,8-12]).
There is, to date, no evidence on the gaps and patterns
in gaps at hospitals or in Liberia. Figure 4 shows a num-
ber of possible patterns using the three-gap framework.
Pattern A demonstrates a significant gap between com-
petence and capacity and is different from pattern B be-
cause after a certain point, increases in competence haveFigure 4 Examples of possible relationships among competence, capno impact on capacity. Pattern B, in contrast, shows
that when competence increases, capacity also in-
creases. Pattern C demonstrates that for low levels of
capacity, improvements in capacity lead to significant
improvements in performance, but after a certain point,
there is no further increase. Pattern D shows that per-
formance increases with capacity at all levels, but not at a
one-to-one rate.
The policy implications of these patterns are strikingly
different. For example, pattern A suggests that training
is of little use and that programs should focus on improv-
ing capacity. And pattern D suggests that improvement in
capacity will lead to improvements in performance even ifacity, and performance.
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examples of possible patterns and the patterns in the
lower right quadrant are independent of those in the
upper right quadrant. Examining the upper left quad-
rant (the know-do gap), we would look at combinations
of these patterns, and Figure 4 shows two possible com-
binations (A + D and B + C). Note that the implications
of these patterns are different. If the true pattern is
A + D, then training to improve competence is essentially
pointless and it is far better to focus on improvements in
infrastructure, equipment, and medicine to improve cap-
acity and to focus as well on the motivation to improve
effort.
Intensive facility evaluation
In order to measure the competence, capacity, and per-
formance of health workers (doctors, clinicians, and
nurses) at treatment and control facilities for selected
hospitals, we will undergo an intensive facility evaluation
at each facility at the baseline, midpoint (2.5 years) and
final point (5 years). The evaluation is designed to meas-
ure the following:
1) The presence of health workers and their basic
qualifications
2) Capacity and competence of health workers, using
case studies and vignettes
3) Performance of health workers, using direct
observation
4) Availability of key equipment and materials, using
direct assessment by the research team
5) Structural assessment of facilities, using direct
assessment by the research team
6) Patient satisfaction, using patient exit surveys
7) Health worker motivation, using health worker
surveys.
It is not possible to measure the competence, capacity,
or performance in all possible situations, so the evalu-
ation will focus on the instruments as outlined in Table 2.
The instruments used to measure these elements are
available at https://sites.google.com/site/hfqualityassess-
ment, on the page titled Hospital Quality Assessment.
aHealth worker motivation surveys are a blend of meth-
odologies from [13,14].
The actual measurement of competence, capacity, and
performance comes from a series of yes or no questions
on each instrument. For each condition, there is some-
thing that the health worker is supposed to do (take the
patients temperature or check that the patient has
signed a consent form, for example) and the member of
the research team administering the case study, vignette,
or direct observation vignette will indicate whether
that thing was done. The competence, capacity, andperformance score for each health worker is the per-
centage of items required or suggested by protocol that
are actually administered. This follows the standard
process for scoring direct observation and vignettes as
outlined in [15,16].
Competence and capacity are measured for identical
procedures and differentiated by the use of specific ques-
tions about the availability of equipment. For example,
when assessing newborn care with the Newborn Health
Simulation vignette, the health worker is asked “Please
tell me, when a healthy baby is delivered, what care is
important to give them immediately after birth and the
first few hours thereafter?” One of the items that indi-
cate competence is that they administer vitamin K. If the
health worker indicates this procedure, the enumerator
is instructed to verify that vitamin K is immediately
available to the health worker. Saying they would admin-
ister vitamin K indicates competence, saying they would
administer vitamin K together with having vitamin K
present indicates capacity. Of course, the final test comes
during direct observation when we indicate whether or
not the health worker actually did administer vitamin K.
In other cases, at the end of the case study, we ask “what
equipment or materials would you have used if it had been
available to you?”
Thus, we have designed specific elements of our survey
to measure competence, capacity, and performance. These
measures can be used for item-wise comparisons and
overall health worker or facilities scores.
Item comparisons In some cases, we can measure all
three elements of the same task: does the health worker
know that they are supposed to use vitamin K (compe-
tence), is vitamin K present (capacity), and is vitamin K
used for newborns (performance)? These scores are
dichotomous (yes/no) variables for all such items. These
are the most direct test of the link between the three
measures.
Overall scores for health workers and hospitals In
other cases (for example, the treatment of third-degree
burns), we will not be able to measure performance.
However, measures of competence or capacity for such
items are still useful for measuring the competence of
health workers or facilities, even if these scores cannot
be directly compared to an average performance score
for the same worker. The average competence, capacity,
and performance scores are an average of the dichotom-
ous variables over all applicable questions: for example,
what proportion of the 45 measures of competence can
a health worker appropriately describe? Because not
every health worker will be examined for every available
measure, these scores need to be adjusted for the difficulty
of the items for which they were evaluated and we do this
Table 2 Summary of instruments by service and location
Service Location Intensive evaluation
Direct observation Competence/capacity Exit interview
Obstetrics
Routine delivery Labor ward Labor and delivery Partograph case study A Maternal and neonatal
care exit interview
Partograph case study B
Complicated delivery (PPH,
sepsis, eclampsia)
Delivery room PPH simulation
Routine newborn care Preeclampsia simulation





Recovery ward Labor and delivery recovery
Pediatrics





Emergency intake Pediatric fever, cough, diarrhea Pediatric diarrhea vignette
Pediatric fever vignette
Pediatric cough vignette
Pediatric or general ward Pediatric inpatient monitoring
Emergency, inpatient, surgery




















Hospital ward Post-surgical care and
general ward
Surgery Surgical prep ward Surgery
Operating theater
Recovery ward Post-surgical care
OR cleanup Post-surgical cleanup
Facility
Staff Facility staff roster Staff motivation survey
Infrastructure Facility equipment survey
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where Qi is the score for each health worker or hospital,
qik is a dichotomous variable indicated whether health
worker i demonstrated competence, capacity or per-
formance for item k, and qk is the average score for item
k across the whole sample. Thus, although we can report
that a particular health worker performed 80% of the
items that were required by protocol, a more useful
number is that they performed 15 percentage points
more than the average for all health workers who were
evaluated for that item, for example.
Using the scores for competence, capacity, and perform-
ance, we can validate the selection of control facilities to
match the treated facilities both by examining the levels of
these three measures and by examining the relationships
between these measures across types of facilities. In other
words, is the pattern relating competence to capacity or
relating capacity to performance similar across health
workers in treated and control facilities?
Augmented PBF
The HSSP focuses on rewarding the performance of hos-
pitals as a whole, even though this performance is com-
posed, for the most part, of the aggregated performance
of individuals. The intensive evaluation at three points
in time will help us understand how individual health
workers are responding to the program and, to some de-
gree, will help us separate the influence of (1) training,
(2) infrastructure, equipment, and medicines, and (3)
motivation. However, we cannot definitely understand
the role of financial incentives in changing financial mo-
tivation as separate from improvement management and
information flow.
In order to directly test the role of information
within the context of a PBF program, we are develop-
ing a within-hospital information system that can be
used to feed information to individual health workers
about their effort and performance. Each quarter during
the 5-year life of the program, a few health workers will be
randomly selected into one of two information treatments.
The treatments are designed as follows:
 Control: Information is collected from health
registers on the quantity of services provided and
key measures of performance
 Own performance treatment: For one quarter, the
treated health worker is provided with a weekly
summary of their own quantity and performance
statistics. Compared performance treatment: For one quarter,
the treated health worker is provided with a weekly
summary of their own quantity and performance
statistics compared to the average levels for all other
health workers providing similar services.
All health workers will be part of the control until they
are randomly selected to belong to one of the two treat-
ments. At the conclusion of the quarter as a “treated”
health worker, they will be given a choice to continue in
their current treatment, switch to the other treatment,
or return to the controlb. We will, of course, test for
long-term effects of treatment (beyond the quarter in
which treatment was assigned).
The impact of treatment can be compared to perform-
ance before (for the same health worker) as well as to all
other health workers who are not being treated. Thus,
for each of the variables tested (see below), we will use a
difference in difference strategy, comparing the change
for a health worker who will be treated to their perform-
ance before treatment as well as to the performance of
all other health workers in the control group.
The key element of the design is that we can control
for changes that would have happened normally over
time: both steady improvements and seasonal changes.
Our treatment lasts only one quarter, but we will have
data on many time periods before this quarter and after
this quarter. This increases our statistical power and also
allows us to understand the dynamics of the control
group well as the post-treatment group [17,18]. Thus,
we can include a specification in which we control for
quarterly effects non-parametrically by including a dummy
variable and coefficient for each quarter for all health
workers in the facility. Thus, the outcome for health worker
i in facility j at time t is a function of that health worker’s
average outcome (αI), the flexible time effect for all health





, and the treatment status of
health worker i at time t (ρTit).




It is also possible that health workers have individual
trends (improving or worsening over time) even after
controlling for what is happening in the facility as a
whole. In this case, we can only control for a linear time
trend (γit), but this variable could potentially be important
in understanding how health workers respond to the
combination of PBF incentives and individual information.
Y ijt ¼ αi þ βj
⇀
t
⇀þγ it þ ρTit þ it
The exact outputs to be measured remains to be
established, but at this stage, we propose the following
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in-house register data):
 Quantity of services provided
– Deliveries (vaginal and C-section), surgeries
(by type)
 In-hospital outcomes
– Post-surgical and post-delivery fevers in recovery
ward
– Mortality
 Re-admission rates following specific surgical
procedures
 Evidence of medical errors and complications
– Routine episiotomy
– Perineal tears
– Delay in initiating breastfeeding
– Needle pricks
 Length of stay for well-understood illnesses
 Referral feedback completeness
 Data completeness
– Surgical consent forms
– Anesthesiology reports
– Partograph forms
Hospitals in Liberia use a data collection system that
tracks individual patients through the services provided
during the course of their visit to a hospital, as well as
across visits to the same hospital. The records of a pa-
tient’s visit are kept both in registers devoted to a room
or service (e.g., intake, laboratory, and wound dressing),
and on their medical record, stored in the hospital’s re-
cords room. Every patient has a unique patient number
assigned when they first visit a facility and this number
is used in all future visits.
The goal of the data collection exercise is to digitize
select aspects of the paper data such that (1) multiple
visits by the same patient can be linked and (2) statistics
can be compiled about individual health workers who
participate in the patient care. At each of the project
hospitals, we will contract with a ministry of health em-
ployee to serve as the data entry clerk for the hospitals.
These individuals have already been trained as data custo-
dians but have not been asked to digitize any of the data.
The advantage of using individuals who have already
working in the system is that 1) they are familiar with the
paperwork system and 2) they are already certified by the
MoHSW to handle private patient information.
Did the HSSP improve outcomes?
The ultimate goal of the HSSP is to increase the health
of the population that uses the targeted health facilities.
Such an outcome is difficult to measure directly but can
be measured through the proxy outcome measures out-
lined in Table 1 above: (a) utilization, (b) satisfaction andtrust, and (c) health outcomes, both for patients who use
the hospital and for households in the communities that
surround the hospital. These outcome measures are pro-
vided to estimate and describe the impact of the program.
However, they are collected only at those facilities that are
part of the project and therefore there are no controls.
There are three main sources of data on outcomes.
 Hospital registers: Data from hospital registers can
be used to compare the numbers for different types
of services over time. For example, by following
individual cases over time, we can measure important
outcomes, indicative of medical errors. In addition,
retrospective case review can be used to measure the
rate of medical errors, even when these errors do not
lead to adverse outcomes. These outcomes are drawn
from the same data set used for the augmented PBF.
 Patient exit surveys: While this data source is
particularly useful for outpatient services, patients
who received inpatient services can also be
interviewed at patient discharge. Patients will be
interviewed regarding the location they traveled
from when they choose the facility, their satisfaction
with services provided, and their trust in the
services provided. This data is drawn from the exit
interviews in the intensive facility evaluation.
 Qualitative community utilization and opinion
assessments: In two communities within each
hospital catchment area, we will conduct focus
group interviews on attitudes towards the facility.
We will deliberately create a focus group of women
focusing on issues around antenatal care, childbirth,
and postnatal care. As part of these focus groups, we
will conduct short interviews with participants on
recent utilization of the specific hospital.Trial status
The instruments have been piloted, and the baseline data
for the treated facilities has been collected but has not
been cleaned or analyzed. As the project was starting to
collect baseline data in the control facilities, the MoHSW
asked the evaluation team to pause our project so that
they could reassign resources to the Ebola crisis and avoid
unnecessary exposure. We expect to resume activities as
the crisis ends and will have to re-evaluate the validity of
the baseline data. It may be necessary to recollect this data
to establish a new baseline and use the original baseline as
a way of understanding the impact of the crisis on these
hospitals.Endnotes
aThe instruments benefitted from the contribution and
previous works of teams at the World Bank working on
Bawo et al. Implementation Science  (2015) 10:9 Page 11 of 11programs in various countries, in particular the HRITF
impact evaluation for the Kyrgyz Republic.
bHealth workers who return to the control will not be
included in the control comparison group because there
may be long-term effects that alter their behavior even
after the treatment has concluded.
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